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Genetic Modification of Animals 
 
e speak about genetic modification when one or more genes 
(DNA-molecules with a certain function within the cell or 
organism) or combinations of DNA-molecules (so-called 
gene-constructs) are introduced into the animal involved.   
One method which is often used is that the DNA-molecules are injected 
with a very fine needle in the fertilized egg. We speak about transgenic 
animals when the genes come from a different species. This method may 
be used for different purposes: to increase production in animal 
husbandry, to make animals  resistant to diseases, or to change animals 
in such a way that they produce certain medically useful products in 
their milk. Once the genetically modified animals are developed they 
may also be multiplied by cloning techniques. 
 
Mice are used to a great extent nowadays in biomedical research to 
study the function of human genes, especially in connection with their 
role in human diseases. The animals are manipulated in order to use 
them as research models. For this purpose genes may also be ‘knocked 
out’, to see what happens or, when they are not functioning well, to 
replace them by other genes. The techniques of genetic modification are 
potentially very powerful techniques, especially if combined with other 
reproductive techniques such as in vitrofertilization, the freezing and 
transportation of embryos, embryo transplantation, etc.  Economic 
competition and the curiosity of the scientists drives this technique 
forward, and it is not surprising that many people are concerned about 
these developments. In the beginning of the so-called recombinant-DNA 
debate in the seventies, the emphasis was on safety issues (the safety of 
human beings). In connection with plants it is the deliberate release of 
genetically modified plants into the environment, and the ecological 
risks of doing so which attracts attention. When we come to animals and 









In the public discussion about genetic modification of animals in the 
Netherlands the concept of the 'intrinsic value' of animals plays an 
important role. According to many authors in the field of animal ethics 
only a particular class of sentient animals, with the capacity to suffer 
pain, have an intrinsic value. I have called this a zoocentric moral view 
on animals.1 In the zoocentric view a comparison is made with human 
beings, where the concept of intrinsic value has been in use for a long 
time. Certain human experiences (of freedom, or pleasure) are said to be 
of intrinsic value when this value can not be derived from any higher 
value. Similarly zoocentric ethicists argue that what sentient (vertebrate) 
animals and human beings have in common is that they can experience 
pleasure and pain in a more or less conscious way, and therefore 
animals have (experiences of) intrinsic value as well. This zoocentric 
view is a well established view, in the sense that in many countries laws 
for the protection of animals are based on it. In animal experimentation 
laws for instance, the main emphasis is on the prevention of the 
suffering of animals. 
 
Those who stick to this zoocentric view follow the same kind of 
reasoning with respect to the genetic modification of animals. Bernard 
Rollin is a good example.2 According to Rollin genetic engineering must 
be seen as a morally neutral tool. Morality comes in when the animals 
suffer as a result of genetic engineering. A consequence of this theory of 
animal ethics is that Rollin sees no moral problems with adapting 
animals to the system of intensive animal husbandry by means of 
genetic manipulation, for instance through the modification of an 
animal's instinctive needs or the reduction of stress. As long as the 
animal has a certain need, it may suffer when it cannot fulfil this need, 
but when we can take away the need through genetic engineering there 
will be no suffering. 
 
                                                          
1 H. Verhoog, ‘The concept of intrinsic value and transgenic animals.’ Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 5/2, (1992), pp.147-160.  
2 B.E. Rollin, ‘The Frankenstein thing: the moral impact of genetic engineering of 
agricultural animals on society and future science’, in Genetic Engineering of Animals. An 
Agricultural Perspective, eds. J.W. Evans and A. Hollaender (Plenum, New York, 1986), 
pp.285-297; B.E. Rollin, The Frankenstein syndrome. Ethical and social issues in the genetic 
engineering of animals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995). (Editor’s note:  
See review in Animal Issues, 1/1, 1997.)  
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Many people feel an intuitive resistance to this view; they think that the 
housing system should be adapted to the needs or characteristic 'nature' 
of the animal and not the other way around. I argued against Rollin3  
that in order to determine whether animals are suffering, or that their 
wellbeing is disturbed, we usually refer to the animal’s species-specific 
needs. When we allow unrestricted manipulation of these needs, we 
might loose the only yardstick we have to determine whether the 
animal is suffering or not.  
 
A way to accommodate this intuitive resistance is to rethink the concept 
of intrinsic value. The original meaning is that an animal has a value of 
its own, independent of any instrumental value an animal may also 
have for man. To respect animals for their own sake, we have to 
transcend the utility relationship and emphasize their relative 
independence ('autonomy'), their species-specific nature and their 
integrity. In Rollin's view it is not the nature of the animal itself which 
matters, but the actually felt experiences related to the satisfaction or 
frustration of the needs involved in the having of such a nature. I hold 
that the characteristic nature itself, the species-specific characteristic 
way of being of an animal (its 'essence'), matters morally. To argue for 
this position one has to emphasize the role of the philosophy of nature 




The Moral Relevance of ‘Naturalness’ 
 
In the present intellectual climate the very idea that the 'naturalness' of 
something has moral significance needs further clarification. To say that 
naturalness has moral significance suggests that we derive norms and 
values from nature, and this is seen by many people as an example of 
the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy'. In short, this fallacy says that the 
‘ought’ (what we ought to do) can not be derived from the ‘is’ (factual 
statements about reality, about nature). 
 
                                                          
3 H. Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’ in Morality, Worldview and 
Law  eds. A. W. Mussjchenga et al (Van Gorcum, Assen), 1992, pp.267-278.  
4 In a recent analysis of the public debate about genetic engineering of animals, aiming 
at a research agenda of important ethical question, one of the questions which came 
out was: ‘What are the implications of the attitudes towards the naturalness and 
natural values for policy on the genetic modification of animals and the ethical 
weighing procedure required for that policy?’. J. Vorstenbosch and L. van Voorthuisen 
Ethiek, politiek en genetische modificatie van dieren (Netherlands Office of Technology 




I would like to discuss this question of the naturalistic fallacy in the 
context of the meta-ethical question how we can know that a certain 
human action is morally good, how we can justify it. In philosophical 
ethics any appeal to a human or divine authority is not acceptable. It is 
said that the human moral agent should come to an autonomous, free 
judgement, and the reasons for coming to this judgement must be 
public. An appeal to one’s personal feelings or one’s intuition is not 
enough.  
 
A judgement can only be free when it is not forcefully imposed upon 
oneself. To morally legitimate one’s actions by appealing to nature or 
natural laws (‘it is good because it is in agreement with natural laws, or 
because it is natural’) is problematic because it overlooks the freedom of 
human beings. Our behaviour may, in a third-person perspective, be 
influenced by many ‘outside’ factors (genetic, physiological, social), but 
in a first-person perspective the experience of freedom is basic. On that 
basis we expect from people (not from animals) that they can account 
for their moral decisions; we hold them responsible for their choices. 
Holding people responsible for their behaviour would be senseless 
without the principle of freedom. When we say that people behave the 
way they do because it is encoded in their genes or ingrained in their 
brains, or because it is their ‘nature’ to act that way, this statement can 
be interpreted in two ways. In the third-person perspective it can be 
seen as a particular explanation of behaviour. When used in a first-
person perspective, as a moral justification of one’s behaviour (‘I had to 
do it, I had no choice because it is in my genes’), then  it is a case of a 
naturalistic fallacy. We also speak about biological or genetic 
determinism in this context. 
 
The meta-ethical reason why we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, or 
values from facts, is not primarily a logical problem, but has to do with 
the difference between a first-person perspective based on our 
immediate experience and a third-person perspective in which human 
behaviour is described and/or explained from outside. A philosophical-
anthropological theory must include the idea of freedom and morality 
as one of the basic characteristics of the human species, of being human. 
A consequence for normative ethics is that what we ought to do (as 
opposed to what is) refers to something which is not yet there, an 
unrealized potential or goal, which might be realized in the future if we 
want it. Values are involved in all human behaviour. They are not 
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Normative valuation, pointing out what we ought to strive after,  
always involves both a human being as subject and an object which is 
valued. When the focus is on the human being,  the object valued is said 
to have an instrumental value. It is instrumental/contributive to the 
realisation of an intrinsic value of human beings. When, in valuation, 
the human being is focusing on the object for its own sake (because it 
has a good of its own), then the intrinsic value of the object is 
emphasized. The relation is non-instrumental in this case. 
 
The attribution of intrinsic value to an object is a free human decision in 
the sense that we are not in any way forced to make the attribution by 
our own nature. This also is the case when the object is a human being.  
That animals by (logical) necessity must have intrinsic value, or ought to 
be given intrinsic value because of certain facts about their nature, is not 
the case either. This does not mean that no reasons can be given why 
animals are appropriate objects of moral concern; I can try to make it 
plausible to someone who in the first instance does not believe it.  One 
reason could be the fact that we usually deal with domestic animals who 
are to a smaller or larger degree dependent on human beings. Looking 
at them from a (socio)-ecological perspective we might say that we have 
made them a part of the human community. When they suffer because 
of our treatment we are responsible for this. When talking about wild 
animals we might be impressed by their relative autonomy, by the 
evolutionary wisdom or (God’s) creativity expressed in the animal’s 
form and behaviour. Who are we in nature that we have the right to use 
animals for any purpose we like? The attribution of intrinsic value 
comes down to a human decision about which entities we want to bring 
into the moral domain. 
 
In the anthropocentric view non-human living entities are not included 
in the moral domain, and therefore their intrinsic value is not 
acknowledged. They only have an instrumental value. In the zoocentric 
view only those natural entities are included in the moral domain which 
have conscious experiences (sentient animals). In the biocentric view all 
living beings can have both instrumental and intrinsic value for human 
beings. 
  
When it is correct to say that attributing intrinsic value to animals or 
other organisms is a normative decision, then having intrinsic value is 
dependent on and inseparable from the act of moral valuation. It is only 
after the decision has been made that animals have a good-of-their-own, 
that the characteristic nature of the animal becomes morally relevant. 




adapted and bring them into a human environment, then it is our 
knowledge of the ‘nature’ of the animals which must guide us in finding 
out what the animals need for their well-being. On the basis of this 





Cartesian dualism and ‘Naturalness’ 
 
Also important in our consideration of the relation between facts and 
values is the Cartesian dualism associated with modern natural science. 
Many of the confusions inherent in discussions about morality and 
nature are due to this Cartesian dualism between man, defined as 
'subject' (res cogitans) and nature, defined as 'object' (res extensa). 
Epistemologically we can say that the acquisition of knowledge by 
necessity presupposes a distinction between a knowing subject and an 
object to be known. In this distinction the object may be something we 
experience as being outside of us (a table, another person, a flower, etc.), 
but it may just as well be an inner experience which may become the 
object of our knowledge. This epistemological distinction, based upon 
our direct experience (first-person perspective) does not say anything 
about the nature of the object perceived. The problems with Cartesian 
dualism do not arise if interpreted in this epistemological sense. The 
problems crop up when it is interpreted as an ontological distinction 
between two completely distinct and unrelated worlds, res cogitans and 
res extensa.  
 
The ontological distinction is at the very basis of modern natural 
science, where nature is tacitly defined as res extensa, and where it is 
seen as the task of science to discover the 'objective' laws of nature, 
which are seen as totally independent of our 'subjective' (personal) 
experiences of the world. It is then, that the domain of values and the 
domain of facts become two completely separate domains. As subject, 
the human being stands outside nature. Rationality, self-consciousness 
and freedom are seen as characteristics of the human subject, and to 
attribute these qualities to nature, as res extensa, is considered to be 
anthropomorphism.  
 
Also moral valuation is seen as a typical characteristic of the subject, as 
'subjective'. Values are then seen as a product of the human mind; they 
are not found in nature as res extensa. It is believed to be the explicit 
task of natural science to discover the primary, objective qualities or 
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properties of nature. They are supposed to tell us what is 'real', 
independent of the world as it is experienced by the human subject. 
 
In such an ontologically interpreted dualistic framework it becomes 
logically impossible to derive values from facts, ought from is. Notice 
that 'facts' and 'is' do not refer to nature as directly experienced by man, 
as part of his life-world, but to the impoverished nature of res extensa, 
devoid of any subjective qualities. This is what Kass5 refers to when he 
says that 'our natural science is, quite deliberately, most 'unnatural'. The 
gap between nature studied scientifically and life lived naturally is seen 
by him as the result of the deliberate choice of modernscience for 
'objectivity'. 
 
In his book 'The phenomenon of life' Jonas6  says: 
 
The contention -almost axiomatic in the modern climate of 
thought- that something like an "ought" can issue only 
from man and is alien to everything outside him, is more 
than a descriptive statement: it is part of a metaphysical 
position which has never given full account of itself. 
 
If the Cartesian dualism underlying modern science is a 'deliberate 
choice', not being itself the result of our understanding of the world, but 
an assumption which defines a particular way of looking at the world, 
then the question arises whether we could make a different choice. Jonas 
looked for what he called a reunion between the subjective and the 
objective. He believed that the realisation of such a reunion could only 
be effected from the objective end, through a revision of the idea of 
'nature', postulating a continuity, rather than a duality between mind 
and nature. In the dualistic view ethics belongs to the subjective side, 
without any objective foundation. When a continuity between mind and 
nature is postulated, ethics could be conceived as part of the philosophy 
of nature, grounded in 'an objective assignment of the nature of things'. 
 
In the tradition of Whitehead, Jonas, like several other 'organicist 
philosophers',7 refuses to interpret the world as a purely material 
mechanism, driven forward by efficient causes, devoid of any 
subjectivity, mind or inwardness. In Jonas's philosophy of nature man's 
                                                          
5 L.R. Kass, Toward a more natural science. Biology and Human Affairs (The Free Press, 
New York, 1985), Preface, p.ix. 
6 H. Jonas, The phenomenon of life (Harper and Row, New York, 1966), p.283. 
7 We can think here of the work of several European continental scientists-
philosophers, such as Goethe, Portmann, Buytendijk, Viktor von Weizsacker, Plessner 
and others. Some of these are introduced by Marjorie Grene in Approaches to a 




subjectivity has become a part of nature; it is no longer alien to nature, 
as it is when nature is interpreted as res extensa.  
 
What is appearing in man's consciousness, thoughts about nature for 
instance, can now be seen as far less estranged from nature than in the 
Cartesian dualistic view. The epistemological point that thoughts about 
nature arise in human consciousness and depend on our own activity, 
can not be denied however. What is denied is that the 'content' of these 
thoughts necessarily comes from man only and not from what is going 
on in nature. The same could be true with respect to values, and in 
particular with the intrinsic value of animals. When you look at an 
animal as a Cartesian object in an anthropocentric context, you may not 
be able to discover its intrinsic value. You have to see the animal in a 
more phenomenological way as a being with subject-character as well, 
with whom we can communicate (we may call this a second-person 
perspective). As they sometimes say in environmental ethics: by really 
participating in nature in a deep-ecological way, natural entities can 
become partners of whom we learn that they have a good of their own. 
By learning this and by listening to what they have to tell us, respect for 




The Role of Philosophies of Nature 
 
We have come to the conclusion that in a biocentric view the 
characteristic ‘nature’ of the animals involved has become a morally 
relevant category. We have also seen that one’s philosophy of nature 
affects one’s view of the relation between facts and values. The role of 
philosophies of nature also comes to the fore in another way. Some 
biologists might argue that speaking about the characteristic or essential 
nature of an organism refers to an outdated, typological way of looking 
at animal species. And, when it is not possible to define what is 
specifically ‘good’ for the animal, does not also the concept of intrinsic 
value become implausible? As an illustration I would like to refer to an 
article by Mauron,8 in which he criticizes the view put forward by 
Jeremy Rifkin that ‘the crossing of species borders and the incorporation 
of genetic traits from one species directly into the germ-line of another 
species represents a fundamental assault on the principle of species 
integrity and violates the right of every species to exist as a separate, 
                                                          
8 Alex Mauron, ‘Ethics and the ordinary molecular biologist’ in Scientists and their 
responsbility  eds. W.R. Shea and B. Sitter (Watson Publishing International, Canton, 
1989), pp.249-265.  
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identifiable creature’.  Mauron points out that speaking about species as 
separate, identifiable entities is 'essentialistic language', which is 
incompatible with the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook immanent 
in much of current biology after the Darwinian revolution. In this 
philosophical outlook the emphasis is on competition between 
individual organisms within populations. 
 
To most biologists, Mauron says, the new technical opportunities to mix 
genetic material from different sources, is a natural extension of the way 
these biologists are trained to think about individuals, genomes and 
species. Given the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook the 
development of genetic engineering can be seen as a ‘logical 
development’. To assume that there are inviolable species barriers he 
considers to be wishful thinking; as humans we may want to establish 
such barriers for ethical reasons, say between man and other animals, 
but we cannot 'read' such barriers in the state of nature. To do so would 
imply the use of an arbitrary concept of ‘naturality’. Mauron reaches the 
following conclusion: 
 
All this points to a form of naturalistic fallacy that often 
muddles the discussion of genetic engineering and many 
other issues concerning the impact of science on society. I 
do not think that the "naturality" of an action has any 
bearing on its ethical standing. Of course, many things that 
are done under the guise of "respecting nature" are 
valuable and well worth doing. Why not acknowledge 
that they are so for man-centered reasons (improving his 
safety or quality of life)?9 
 
I think that Mauron's reasoning is based on a number of doubtful 
assumptions. First of all, to speak about 'species integrity' or to show 
respect for the integrity of a species or the species-specific 
characteristics,  one need not necessarily believe in discontinuity or 
constancy of types, which is considered by Mauron to be characteristic 
of essentialism. The evolutionist Gould,10 who cannot possibly be called 
an 'essentialist', speaks about the integrity of animal species because of 
their long evolutionary history. That the characteristics of species can 
change over time is not the morally relevant point; also individual 
organisms such as human beings, change over time, but this does not 
affect their integrity. The point is that the constitutive characteristics of a 
species are not just accidental ones, chosen by man to categorize a class 
of more or less similar animals; the point is that they are the result of a 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p.255. 




long evolutionary process, which has led to a more or less harmoniously 
balanced whole, in close relation with a particular environment. With 
such a species-concept in mind, the interference with modern techniques 
of genetic modification, thereby creating 'trans-genic' animals, might be 
seen as an assault on the integrity of a species. The existence of species 
barriers (no exchange of genetic material)  between most species of 
animals is an empirical fact, which has little to do with the idea that 
species change over time.  
 
The question now is, whether the existence of these empirical barriers 
has any moral relevance for human behaviour with respect to these 
animals. Mauron says that we may want to establish these barriers for 
ethical reasons (thereby making them 'inviolable'), but we cannot 'read' 
such barriers in the state of nature. 
  
The last quotation clearly shows that Mauron holds an anthropocentric 
view of nature. Within this view it is true by necessity that something 
can only be valued by human beings for man-centred reasons. That all 
valuation is a human activity does not imply that the content of the 
valuation does  only depend on a specific interest we as humans have in 
the outcome of the valuation. In a zoocentric and biocentric view it is 
possible for humans to value something for its own sake. 
 
Finally I would like to say a few words about Mauron's interpretation of 
the naturalistic fallacy. He says: 'I do not think that the "naturality" of an 
action has any bearing on its ethical standing'. In connection with the 
topic under discussion this is a very confusing statement. Rifkin did not 
say that it is ‘unnatural’ to cross species barriers, and therefore we are 
not allowed to do it. I am not sure what his reasons are for accepting the 
principle of species integrity. He may have had philosophical or 
religious reasons, but whatever the reasons, a naturalistic fallacy need 
not be implied. In a non-anthropocentric normative theory for 
establishing the moral quality of human behaviour with respect to 
animals or nature, the principle of naturality plays a very important 
role. Out of respect for the intrinsic value of an animal we ought to treat 
animals, as much as possible, in such a way that we do not infringe 
upon their species-specific characteristics; we should take into account 
their 'characteristic nature'.  In a biocentric view we are not talking 
about the naturality of 'human action', but about the role in human 
action of the nature of the object of human action. 
 
Interesting in Mauron’s article is the acknowledgment of the anti-
essentialist philosophical outlook immanent in much of current (neo-
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darwinian) biology. This does not mean, however, that essentialist 
outlooks are totally lacking in modern biology. One example to the 
contrary is Brian Goodwin, who is generally seen as a representative of 
a structuralist approach within biology. Structuralism has been 
portrayed by Resnik11 as the rebirth of ‘rational morphology’, a kind of 
typological thinking which dominated biology in the pre-darwinian 
period. Goodwin12 himself has described the conflict between 
structuralism and neo-darwinism as a conflict between typological 
thinking, which sees reality in an underlying nature/kind/type, and 
population thinking, according to which the type is a human 
abstraction, only the variation between the individuals is real. 
 
Because of Goodwin’s structuralist philosophy of nature he is critical of 
many aspects of genetically engineering plants and animals. In his paper 
‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures’13 he again 
contrasts his approach with the neo-darwinistic one, according to which 
species have arisen by historical contingency, through random genetic 
variation and selection of the fitter variants. In Goodwin’s structuralist 
approach species acquire a status that they do not have in Darwinism, 
as natural kinds with distinctive natures. Such a view, he says, invites a 
relationship to organisms that recognises their intrinsic qualities, so that 
they are valued for their beings rather than simply for their utility.  
 
In Goodwin’s book ‘How the leopard changed its spots’14 he says: ‘An 
organism or a work of art expresses a nature and a quality that has 
intrinsic value and meaning, with no purpose other than its own self-
expression’. Goodwin pleads for the need of a science of qualities, as 
complementary to the traditional natural science of quantities. 
  
For Goodwin it does not seem to be any problem to relate his 
structuralist realist philosophy of biology with the idea of intrinsic 
value.  We can conclude that a biocentric normative theory seems to be 
more plausible for a biologist adhering to a more holistic  philosophy of 
nature, whereas the molecular biologist Mauron uses a nominalist 
                                                          
11 David Resnik, ‘The rebirth of rational morphology: a process structuralism’s 
philosophy of biology’, Acta Biotheoretica 42, (1994), pp.1-14.  
  
12 G. Webster and B.C. Goodwin, ‘The origin of species: a structuralist approach’, 
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5, (1982), pp.15-47.  
13 Brian Goodwin, ‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures: the case for 
a moratorium on deliberate release’ in Coping with deliberate release. The limits of risk 
assessment, ed. A van Dommelen (International Centre for Human and Public Affairs, 
Tilburg, 1996), pp.73-78.  
14 B.C. Goodwin, How the leopard changed its spots. The evolution of complexity (Scribner’s 




philosophy to legitimate his anthropocentric normative theory. This 




The ‘Unnaturalness’ of Modern Science 
 
Let us return to Kass' statement that natural science is quite deliberately 
most 'unnatural'. Kass pleads for a more ‘natural’ science, that is closer 
to our immediate experience, whereas Wolpert15 holds that ‘natural’ 
thinking, by which he means day-to-day common sense thinking, will 
never give an understanding about the nature of things. Doing science 
requires one to remove oneself from one’s personal experience, and he 
mentions molecular biology to illustrate this. For Wolpert there is no 
room for Kass’ more natural science or for Goodwin’s science of 
qualities; it is science or nothing. 
 
In contrast to Wolpert I think that within biology as a whole we have 
scientific disciplines which are closer to our everyday experience of 
nature and disciplines which are far away from it. When we enter a 
modern scientific laboratory we discover very little of the 'nature' as we 
experience it in our everyday life. 
  
Biologists and historians of biology are well aware of the tension which 
exists, since the nineteenth century in particular, between the naturalists 
and the experimentalists.16   It looks as if, on the eve of the coming 'age 
of biotechnology' this tension is intensifying. There seems to be an 
increasing gap between the study of nature as directly given in our life-
world and a 'second nature' made in the laboratory. Transgenic 
creatures first have to be 'made' before they can be studied. 
  
To understand the ethical questions which have arisen in discussions 
about the genetic engineering of animals it looks as if we have to pay 
much more attention to the processes of transformation which take 
place when nature as given becomes the object of experimental science. 
This question has not received much attention in the philosophy of 
science. It is only recently that sociologists of science and some 
                                                          
15 Lewis Wolpert, The unnatural nature of science (Faber and Faber, London, 1993).  
16 Dobhansky speaks about the distinction between Cartesian and Darwinian aspects of 
biology. It is sometimes expressed as the distinction between restricted sciences, 
dealing with closed systems (usually in the laboratory) and unrestricted sciences, 
dealing with open systems. Mertz and McCauley (Synthese 43/1, 1980) analyze the 
differences between laboratory ecology and field ecology; field ecologists speaking 
about the ‘unreality of laboratory research’.  
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philosophers of science have started to pay attention to the role of the 
experiment in creating a 'second nature', which is sometimes far 
removed from the 'first nature' of our direct experience. 
 
 I would like to give one example which illustrates this development. 
Michael Lynch17 describes the transformation in experimental biology of 
the 'naturalistic animal', the animal as we know it in our daily 
experience, into the 'analytic animal' as object of natural science. He 
describes how laboratory procedures assure the removal of the 
characteristics which make up the naturalistic animal; the result is an 
artefact. In the laboratory, phenomena are created and perpetuated, 
which could never have arisen in nature. 
 
Could it be that molecular biologists such as Mauron can not accept the 
moral relevance of the concept of naturality, because they are no longer 
dealing with given nature, because their work has become totally 
'unnatural'? If reductionistic experimental molecular biology is 
constructing a second nature in the laboratory, then the 'objective facts' 
of the molecular biologist can be seen as the final result of a process of 
transformation of nature, taking place in the laboratory. In experimental 
science 'objectivity' is more and more loosing the meaning it has for the 
naturalist (describing and explaining nature as directly given in our 
experience); objectivity is defined as reproducibility of results and in 
biology this can usually only be obtained under laboratory conditions. 
Reproducibility is a necessary condition for the application of 
knowledge in technology. 
 
This view upon science goes very much against the view of 
positivistically inclined scientists such as Wolpert, who believe that the 
science which abstracts from our direct experience of nature is 
describing nature as it 'really' is (primary qualities), the 'objective facts', 
totally devoid of any subjectivity. According to more relativistic 
philosophers and sociologists of science, these facts of the laboratory 
must be seen as products (constructs) of human thinking and 
experimentation. Facts are not simply given in experimental science, 
they are always the result of specific interpretations of what is 
perceived.  
 
According to such a non-positivistic analysis there are good reasons to 
believe that the experimentally transformed second nature of the 
molecular biologist is not value-free. It may not just be describing nature 
                                                          
17 M.E. Lynch, ‘Sacrifice and the transformation of the animal body into a scientific 




'objectively' ('true' to the object), but transforming it on the basis of a 
very specific design. The experimental design in biotechnology is based 
on a specific anthropocentric attitude towards nature: interfering in 
nature in order to gain control over nature. We could even say that the 
nominalistic concept of nature of some of the more extreme defenders of 
relativism provides a perfect legitimation for genetically engineering 
nature. If nature is no more than a human construct, then there is 
nothing in nature itself preventing us from reconstructing it, nothing of 
intrinsic value, withholding us from disturbing the integrity of either 
individual organisms or, indirectly, of the species to which they belong. 
And ultimately, why should we refrain from the patenting of transgenic 
organisms when such organisms are seen as human inventions, as 
artefacts, which did not exist before the interference of the genetic 
engineer? Arnim von Gleich18 gives a good characterisation of the 
classical ideal of the 'hard' sciences, versus that of the 'soft' sciences. 
Hard sciences are reductionistic, experimental sciences, characterised by 
various forms of abstraction, quantification etc. and aiming at 
intervention in and control over nature. Very different are the ideals of 
the 'soft' sciences, which stay much closer to the life-world as 
experienced by man. The mechanistic concept of nature is replaced here 
by an organismic one; methodical reductionism is replaced by a holistic 
approach and experimentation is taken as a dialogue with nature, and 
not as a subordination of nature. 'Soft' for von Gleich does not have the 







In experimental reductionistic science we see a progressive 
transformation of given nature, as directly experienced in our life-
world, to a second or more or less artificial nature. In this process the 
qualitative aspects of nature, which are so evident in our life-world, are 
lost sight of. The more science is impregnated with instrumental values, 
the more difficult it becomes to see the intrinsic value of nature. There is 
an inbuilt tension between the very process of objectifying nature, 
demanded by the ontological interpretation of Cartesian dualism, and 
the idea that animals (or nature) have intrinsic value. The realm of 
values and the realm of knowledge get divorced from each other. 
 
                                                          
18 Armin von Gleich, Der wissenschaftliche Umgang mit der Natur. (Campus Verlag, 
Frankfurt, 1989).   
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The word 'intrinsic' is closely related to the word 'essence' or 'essential', 
the characteristic nature of something. The anti-essentialism of modern 
(molecular) biology may be needed for greater control over the 
processes of life but, in a time of increasing alienation from nature and 
environmental catastrophes, it always has to be balanced by more 
holistic approaches. The moral relevance of 'naturality' can more easily  
be experienced in our direct sensorial contact with nature. With the 
more phenomenological method of von Gleich's soft science, or 
Goodwin’s science of qualities, we can deepen this experience. The 
'qualitative' knowledge which results from the application of this 
method is very much needed for the evaluation of modern 
biotechnology, and to redress the exaggerated claims of molecular 





Henk Verhoog was born in 1938. He studied biology at the University of 
Amsterdam and since 1968 has been an Associate of the Institute of Theoretical 
Biology of Leiden University (now a section of the Institute of Evolutionary 
and Ecological Sciences).  His philosophical dissertation was about ‘Science and 
the social responsibility of natural scientists’ (1980). His research interests and 
publications are in the field of the relationship between science and ethics, and 
also the philosophical aspects of the human-animal (human-nature) 
relationship. Henk Verhoog teaches biology students about the social and 
philosophical (ethical) aspects of biology. He has been a member of state 
advisory boards on the ethics of animal experimentation (until 1993), and the 
genetic modification of plants and animals. From October 1999 he will be an 
Associate of the Louis Bolk Institute in Driebergen. 
 
 
 16 
